in practice, the Senate acquired greater power and authority than it had had previously. The purpose of this paper is to scrutinize these claims: it will suggest that neither can be accepted without modification. Sulla's package of constitutional change combined solutions to specific problems with an attempt to eliminate conflict from the res publica, and the resulting mix of measures was incoherent. The Senate's position was different as a result of Sulla's changes, but not necessarily stronger. In addition, their implementation was affected both by the nature of his dictatorship and by the recent history of the Senate. These factors created a Senate which was structurally weak, divided, and ineffectual.
A determination to remove opportunities for destructive conflict from the structure of the res publica is a convincing framework within which to understand the changes Sulla introduced to the role of the tribunate of the plebs and to the composition of juries, both of which had effects on the role and composition of the Senate. Every episode of domestic violence over the previous half-century had had its origins in a dispute over legislation proposed by a tribune. 6 Sulla's own consulship in 88 had come under unprecedented attack from the tribune Sulpicius, and he had narrowly escaped death in the rioting which occurred as a result of Sulpicius' proposals and which had led to the death of his daughter's husband. 7 The kind of arguments which could be put forward to legitimize the restriction of the tribunate to 6 See, in general, Meier (n. prouocatio on behalf of individual citizens are also evident: that that was the initial function of the tribunate and that the legislative activity by individual tribunes was supported by an unrepresentative faction with the citizen body. 8 However far the ban on tribunician legislation seemed to subsequent commentators to be an unworkable and unstable attempt to silence the urban populace, we need not posit an unsustainable level of self-delusion on Sulla's part in the belief that restricting legislation to citizens voting in the comitia centuriata on proposals put forward by consuls and praetors might solve, or at least substantially mitigate, the problem of violent factionalism. 9 This reorganisation of legislative practice gave a much greater role to imperium-holding magistrates than hitherto; it also affected the Senate, whose decrees no longer faced the threat of veto.
The change in the composition of the juries can also plausibly be linked to eliminating dissension between equestrians and senators and the exploitation of that conflict by others.
That dispute had been an important, if indirect, factor in the outbreak of the Social War in 91, a catastrophe from which all other more recent disasters could be seen to flow. Once Sulla had decided to rebuild the iudicia publica around seven new standing courts and to provide their juries from the Senate, it would have been apparent that many more senators would be 8 Flower (n. 5), 119 notes the difficulty of accessing Sulla's own intentions. On ancient analyses of the legitimacy of popular politics at Rome, see A. Erskine, The Hellenistic Stoa (London, 1990) , 150-80. Aristocracy (Oxford 1986), 15-31 draws attention to patterns of mortality among the elite, including (22-3) apparently high mortality in the mid-50s. On the other hand, it may be rash to assume that every consular unnoted in the sources was dead, even in a well-documented period: Perperna (n. 24 below) is a useful counter-example.
propriety to the installation of Sulla as dictator; he was, moroever, Sulla's Master of Horse. 45 Santangelo (n. 17), 18-19. It cannot however be assumed that all in this category were Sullan appointments, or that they had not in fact held office, since information about the holders of junior positions is so patchy.
46 Santangelo (n. 17), 20. In particular, there is no sign that Sulla took this opportunity systematically to integrate the newly enfranchised Italian domi nobiles into the Roman governing class.
of quaestors had risen to twenty, the Senate's larger size would be maintained through the accession of twenty new senators each year. 47 The actual size of the Senate after Sulla as a result of the increase in the number of quaestors to twenty cannot be calculated in the absence of actuarial tables and membership data; in addition, the Sullan system did not quite have time to settle into a stable state. 48 For an annual recruitment of twenty individuals aged thirty to produce an overall size of six hundred, an average male life expectancy, at the age of thirty, of sixty years is required. This figure is higher than most modern estimates of probable Roman population structure. 49 It also contrasts with the imperial Senate: this body also recruited twenty quaestors a year and maintained a size of six hundred, but the minimum age for entry was twenty-five. A reasonable conclusion is that the size of the post-Sullan Senate rose gradually from a total of around 450, immediately after Sulla's co-options, towards a figure between five and six hundred. 50 The size of the new Senate was soon noticeable in built form, since Sulla enlarged the existing Senate House. Sulla's appointments to the Senate increased its size very considerably and were, it appears, embedded informally in a distinction between those who had entered in this manner and those 57 On the experience of senators in the 70s, see further C. Steel, 'The Roman Senate and the post-Sullan res publica ', forthcoming in Historia 63.3 (2014) .
58 Ryan (n. 12), 85-87. 59 The reasons for the continuing success of the nobiles in elections through the seventies deserve further attention; one question is the extent to which preference for a candidate with consular ancestry was perceived by voters as a gesture for or against the res publica as Sulla had reconstituted it. On the identification between Sulla's régime and the nobiles, see Cic.
Rosc. Am. 16, where Sulla's victory is described as uictoria nobilitatis. Sulla's changes can be seen as a response to these moments of conflict which, as elsewhere in his programme, sought to establish unipolar rather than multipolar locations of power. These separate spheres were now defined by law.
64
Such a reading is radically different from the standard interpretation of Sulla's res publica as one in which the Senate was dominant. But even so it arguably does not quite go far enough in explaining either Sulla's purposes, insofar as those can be divined, or the results which actually occurred. The Senate became -and perhaps Sulla conceptualised this as a return toa consilium for magistrates, whose function was to offer advice when asked for it by magistrates. As the body which contained the res publica's most distinguished citizens, it also was the right organ from which to draw the jurors in legal cases which affected the res publica. If that were the case, it would explain why Sulla was willing to recruit so heavily into his Senate; it did not need the authority to act independently, and he had no cause to be concerned about the outraged feelings of its existing members.
Finally, this interpretation of the Sullan Senate helps to explain why, in practice, the Sullan res publica did not last, either in its initial form beyond 70, or more fundamentally beyond the outbreak of civil war in 49. Many other factors, above all the response of the Roman people to their loss of power and prestige, are involved. But the Senate was a major design flaw in the overall framework of the res publica as constituted by Sulla. The Senate was composed of two groups with interchangeable membership and conflicting ambitions: those 64 This framework may also explain the presence in Sulla's legislation on a law concerning maiestas -a charge whose initial legal definition was the work of the popularis tribune Saturninus. Imperium-holding magistrates were at the heart of his res publica and were to operate within a defined system of rules.
who policed the actions of the res publica's agents through the courts, and those who acted for the res publica as magistrates. 65 Such a system of oversight could only work effectively if the two groups remained separate, but there was continual traffic between the two groups, as men stood for office, were elected as magistrates and then returned to the status of private individuals. If Sulla had hoped that his appointees would act as a bulwark for his changes he was to be disappointed; and was himself largely responsible for its failure, because he did not provide a mechanism for their renewal and because he also supported the re-emergence of an exclusive nobility which largely monopolized access to imperium. This group, in turn, had only a few years to wait before they felt confident in challenging Sulla's res publica, and its senatorial supporters, and restoring, albeit in an unstable form, a framework which permitted the traditional exchange of favours between aristocrats and the Roman people.
The view that Sulla strengthened the Senate can only be maintained if one believes that larger bodies are more effective than smaller ones. That is clearly not the case. At somewhere between 500 and 600 members, the post-Sullan Senate was not a place where productive discussion took place. It existed to confirm the distinction of those whom the Roman people had elected to office and to demonstrate that the res publica's best citizens advised its magistrates on the conduct of public affairs. It had a useful subsidiary role of avoiding judicial conflict by supplying jurors. But its prominence after Sulla is an illusion, created by the suppression of the people. Sulla's vision had no need of a 'strong Senate': power and authority belonged to the magistrates.
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65 This conflict closely mirrored the division between senators with ambitions towards high office and those without.
University of Glasgow
catherine.steel@glasgow.ac.uk
